Metaphysical foundations of causation: powers or laws of nature?
| dc.contributor.author | Sepetyi, D. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Сепетий, Дмитро Петрович | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-25T06:34:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-10-25T06:34:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.description | https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2110-3044 | uk_UK |
| dc.description.abstract | Abstract: In this article, I discuss Richard Swinburne’s case for the conception of substance causation, identified with the substances-powers-liabilities (SPL) account of causation, versus the conception of event causation, identified with alternative accounts. I specify the place of Swinburne’s argument in the debates about agent causation, and uncover reasons to be sceptical about the claims that substance causation is a genuine alternative to event causation, and that it helps to comprehend the specifics of the causation involved in free agency. | uk_UK |
| dc.identifier.citation | Sepetyi D. Metaphysical foundations of causation: powers or laws of nature? / D. Sepetyi // Metaphysica. – 2021. - vol. 22, no. 2. - P. 295-309. - https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0032. . | uk_UK |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://zsmu.rosbai.com/handle/123456789/15046 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | uk_UK |
| dc.subject | event causation | uk_UK |
| dc.subject | agent causation | uk_UK |
| dc.subject | substance | uk_UK |
| dc.subject | disposition | uk_UK |
| dc.subject | power | uk_UK |
| dc.subject | power | uk_UK |
| dc.title | Metaphysical foundations of causation: powers or laws of nature? | uk_UK |
| dc.type | Article | uk_UK |